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STATE OF UTAH 




T H E S T E E L E R A N C H , 
a Utah Corporation, et. al., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State 
Road Commission to acquire certain real property in 
Juab County for the purpose of constructing a Project 
of the 1-15 Freeway. 
DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on September 20,21, 
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Market value of property taken .... $21,164.50 
Severance damages to remaining 
property $75,000.00 
Total $96,164.50 
The State Road Commission made a motion for a new 
trial which was denied by the District Court. The Com-
mission thereupon brought this appeal. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the 
trial court affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of 
the facts with the exception of noting that Dr. Steele's 
home is an integral part of the ranch operations. Dr. 
Steele directs the operations of his ranch from his home. 
The yard adjacent to the home contains the bulk of the 
other ranch buildings. These facts, repeatedly evidenced 
in the record, (Tr. 90, 93, 121, 130) were omitted in 
appellant's statement of facts. The occupation of Dr. 
Steele is that of a medical doctor and a rancher. (Tr. 86) 
The use of the title doctor alone for Dr. Steele is mis-
leading. I t is not indicative of the management of the 
ranch by Dr. Steele. 
The house and yard were owned by Dr. Steele 
personally and the balance of the ranch by the Steele 
Ranch corporation of which he was the owner of all the 
outstanding capital stock. The ranch was then leased 
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indefinitely by Dr. Steele. The separation of the proper-
ties was directed by Dr. Steele's attorney for par-
ticular tax benefits and for estate planning. (Tr. 93) 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E R E W A S A M P L E C O M P E T E N T 
E V I D E N C E TO S U P P O R T T H E 
J U R Y ' S V E R D I C T . 
Introduction: 
Dr. Steele testified as to the value of his ranch. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18.4(2) states: 
Although there is authority to the con-
trary, the owner of the land taken is generally 
held to be qualified to express his opinion of 
its value merely by virtue of his ownership. He 
is deemed to have sufficient knowledge of the 
price paid, the rents or other income received, 
and the possibilities of the land for use, to have 
a reasonably good idea of what it is worth. 
The weight of his testimony is for the jury, 
. . . . (emphasis added) 
In Salt Lake N U.B. CO. V. Schramm et. al., 56 
Utah 53, 189 P.90 (1820), an eminent domain case in 
which one of the owners had resided on the premises 
all her life and had made frequent inquiries into the 
value of her property, the Utah Supreme Court said 
that it was proper to allow the owner to give opinion 
evidence as to the value of the land. 
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We do not think any good reason can be 
assigned why a person who has occupied and 
used the premises all her life, and has been in-
terested and alert in making inquiry as to its 
value, may not be as well qualified to speak as 
the banker, lawyer, or real estate man, having 
more or less to do with the sales and transfers 
of real property. The means and extent of the 
knowledge of any witness may be gone into 
on cross-examination, and rebutted as to value. 
No rule can be formulated for determining 
the means by which a witness shall acquire the 
necessary knowledge to qualify him to speak 
that will apply in all cases. If, under all circum-
stances, he was in a position to obtain knowl-
edge and form a correct judgment as to values, 
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or 
using the property for purposes for which it 
is adaptable is immaterial, so long as the jury 
is given the benefit of the facts upon which 
opinion of the witness is based, (emphasis 
added) 
In another eminent domain preceeding, State v. 
Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507, (1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court said, 
Mr. Dillree being an owner of the prop-
erty, together with his wife, was a competent 
witness as to the value of the property taken 
and as to severance damages incurred. 
The trial record is replete with testimony indicat-
ing Dr. Steele, the landowner, was well qualified to 
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render an opinion as to the value of his ranch. The 
doctor-rancher had for a period of fifteen years pur-
chased numerous pieces of property as additions to his 
ranch. (Tr. 88) These many purchases alone would give 
him a working knowledge of real estate values in this 
locality. In addition, Dr. Steele was engaged in the 
daily operations of his ranch. (Tr. 94) On the basis 
of this managerial involvement, Dr. Steele testified in 
profuse detail as to the basis for his estimate of sever-
ance damages to his ranch. (Tr. 117, 118, 118, 120, 130, 
131). 
The adequate basis of the Doctor's testimony is to 
be vividly contrasted with the dubious testimony given 
by Victor M. Smith, the State of Utah's expert witness. 
He had never owned or operated a ranch. (Tr. 227). 
In Mr. Smith's opinion the nearness of the freeway had 
no effect on the valuation of the Doctor's home. (Tr. 
236, 237). He was oblivious to any intrusion on the 
privacy to Dr. Steele's home as well as to any adverse 
aesthetic effects of the freeway. (Tr. 237). Mr. Smith 
had limited formal training as an appraiser. (Tr. 224). 
Respondent argues that to label Mr. Smith's testimony 
as expert and to simultaneously invidiously character-
ize Dr. Steele's testimony as "inexpert," as appellant 
in its brief does, is a gross distortion of reality. The 
jury had a duty to weigh and did evaluate the testimony 
of Dr. Steele, the landowner, and Mr. Smith, appellant's 
real estate expert. 
Respondents submit that courts should be extremely 
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cautious in setting aside jury verdicts. Courts must not 
invade the legitimate province of the jury which is to 
weigh the evidence. The weighing of the evidence ad-
duced in order to determine the value of real estate in 
a land condemnation case is extremely subjective. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18.4 states, 
The value of a particular piece of real 
estate cannot be definitely determined by the 
application of any exact principle of science, 
and even after all the possible information bear-
ing upon the question has been weighed by a 
person well qualified to judge, the real value 
still remains a matter of opinion, (emphasis 
added) 
Nevertheless despite the highly subjective nature 
of making evaluations of real estate, it is appellants 
argument that the testimony of a real estate expert 
should be dispositive. Their brief on page 14 states, 
In the Dillree case Justice Henriod dis-
sented arguing that the defendant should be 
bound by the testimony of his own expert wit-
ness. His logic is instructive in this case, (em-
phasis added) 
The entire tenor of appellant's argument is that the 
jury is bound by an expert's testimony. Their brief 
speaks of the verdict being "grossly excessive over the 
experts opinion." If one were to take seriously appel-
lant's argument that the jury is locked in by an expert's 
testimony then the jury itself would be superflous. 
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Fortunately for the judicial system this is not the case. 
Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 18-1 states, 
Generally, the arbiter of the facts, in 
valuing the land appropriated are not limited 
to the knowledge which they acquire from the 
evidence adduced Value is always a matter 
of opinion. The opinions of expert witnesses are 
merely advisory. If they agree with common 
sense and human experience well and good. 
If, however, they differ from ordinary obser-
vation, human experience and common sense 
they may well be ignored, (emphasis added) 
The correct function of expert and opinion evi-
dence in land condemnation cases was set forth at 27 
Am.Jur. 2d at 317 as follows : 
Essentially, the value of land appropri-
ated by eminent domain is a question to be 
established by expert testimony. Indeed, the 
value of a parcel of land taken by eminent 
domain is always a matter of opinion and may 
be proved by opinion evidence . . . . The opin-
ions of experts as to value, however, are not to 
be passively received and blindly followed, but 
are to be weighed by the jury and judged in 
view of all the testimony in the case and the 
jury's own general knowledge of affairs, and 
are to be given only such consideration as the 
jury may believe them entitled to receive, (em-
phasis added) 
Since no error was assigned by the appellant to the 
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jury instructions given, the respondent would assume 
they were proper. The instructions stated (R. 135): 
Your are to consider the testimony of all 
witnesses, but if after a consideration of all the 
evidence in this case, you believe that any wit-
ness who has testified to the value of the land 
and the damage by reason of severance thereto 
gave testimony which is not the reasonable 
value thereof, you may disregard that testi-
mony even though it comes from an expert. 
(emphasis added) 
The instructions also (R. 139) informed the jury to 
evaluate the testimony of the landowner on the basis of 
his experience and qualifications and then give it what-
ever weight they deemed proper. Respondents argue 
that this is precisely what the jury did. 
There was an enormous range in testimony as to 
the damages incurred, for example, the plaintiff's ex-
pert fixed damages at $39,303.20, the defendant's ex-
pert said $68,299.75, and the landowner fixed damages 
at $127,852.00. Such discrepancies in value make the 
advisory capacity of such testimony to the jury even 
more imperative. Such extremes are to be expected and 
arise from the almose incredible complexities involved 
in the task of valuation. 
Appellants in their brief state that the jury "chose 
to completely ignore the testimony of either expert 
appraiser." They also assert that the jury chose the 
"personal, inexpert, unobjective feelings of Dr. Steele 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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rather than the clear preponderance of expert opinion 
based upon market values and experience." There is 
no evidence in the record which affords even a scintilla 
of support to such a sheer guess as to what went on in 
the minds of the jurors. I t is pure speculation of the 
most blantant type which overlooks Dr. Steele's ex-
pertise. 
Appellants had ample opportunity in their cross-
examination of Dr. Steele to reveal any deficiencies in 
his testimony. The factual basis of his testimony re-
mained unscathed after appellant's cross-examination. 
The court in Board of County Commissioners of 
El Paso County v. Barron, 28 Colo. App. 283, 487 
P.2d 579, (1971), an eminent domain case, said, 
Simply because the jury chose one end of 
the spectrum rather than the middle or lower 
end is not in itself grounds for reversal, pro-
vided there is competent evidence to support 
the higher figure. 
Respondents argue that Dr. Steele's testimony con-
stitutes competent evidence; that an experts opinion 
evidence is not to usurp the function of a jury; that 
the jury did in fact utilize the experts testimony but only 
in it's proper advisory context; that the jury did in fact 
evaluate the testimony of the landowner and found such 
testimony competent because it had a substantial basis 
in fact; that this finding was consequently reflected in 
the verdict of damages of $96,164.50 which figure was 
well within the upper spectrum of competent testimony. 
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Further it is obvious from the jury's verdict that 
they took the experts opinion as to the values of the 
land taken and Dr. Steele's value as to severance dam-
age. (Tr. 153-157) (Tr. 220-224) (Tr. 115, 117) 
POINT II 
T H E V E R D I C T W A S NOT E X C E S S I V E . 
The sole issue to be resolved by the trial court was 
the value of the property acquired by the State Road 
Commission and the resulting serevance damages to the 
remainder of the Steele Ranch. How much is just com-
pensation to be paid by the State of Utah? What consti-
tutes an excessive verdict? 
A verdict based upon substantive evidence must 
be upheld unless the award is so excessive so as to "shock 
the enlightened conscience of the court." This is the 
common-law legal criteria determining if an award is 
excessive. Nichols on Eminent Domain at § 17.3 on 
land condemnation cases states, 
. . . . the legal criteria for a determination of 
whether an award is inadequate or excessive 
so as to warrant adverse action by the court, 
are said to be similar to those which govern in 
common-law actions. Even in the fact of con-
flicting evidence, the court will generally re-
fuse to set aside the award or verdict if there 
is evidence to sustain the amount awarded and 
such amount is not palpably inadequate or ex-
cessive, (emphasis added) 
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Respondents are cognizant of the lattitude allowed 
by the statement " shock the enlightened conscience of 
the court" for this is a relative term. Yet, nowhere does 
the State apply this common-law criteria that the verdict 
must "shock the enlightened conscience of the court." 
The nearest approach are their words "to affirm such 
a grossly excessive award." These words however, in 
their brief are used in the limited context of grossly ex-
cessive relative to respondent's expert witnesses valu-
ation. This argument ignores the demonstrated exper-
tise of Dr. Steele's testimony. If the verdict is viewed 
in the context of Dr. Steele's testimony then it certainly 
shocks no ones conscience. Certainly it did not shock the 
conscience of the trial judge. 
The cases cited by appellant on excessive damages 
are distinguishable. In State v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 
33, 448 P2d 347, (1958), one of the reasons the verdict 
was set aside was because of the palpable ignorance of 
the subject matter manifested by the witnesses. This is 
not true in the instant case. 
The case of State Highway Commission v. Barnes, 
443 P.2d 16, (Mont. 1968), was remanded because a 
foundation was not laid that the owner had some peculiar 
means of framing an intelligent and correct judgment 
as to the value of the property. The court said that the 
owners testimony was "not only conjecture but highly 
speculative." This is in sharp contrast with the instant 
case in which Dr. Steele exhibited his detailed knowledge 
of the ranching operations and the severance by the 
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highway upon these operations with the consequent im-
pairment of the ranch's value. The appellants in their 
brief made a minor error in alleging the jury in the 
Barnes case returned a value above the expert's opinion. 
The jury, in fact, awarded a total of $44,379 which was 
much lower than the experts total valuation of $61,680. 
Respondents argue that the question of the exces-
siveness of an award is obviously not amenable to any 
fixed formula. The facts peculiar to each case, in the 
light of general principles of valuation, are determina-
tive. In order for a verdict to be judged excessive it 
must shock the enlightened conscience of the court. Re-
spondents submit that in applying such legal criteria, 
as governs common-law actions, that a verdict of $96,-
164.50 should not shock the conscience of the court. I t 
is not shocking because such an amount is well within 
the upper spectrum of competent testimony. 
P O I N T I I I 
I T W A S CORRECT TO A D M I T EVI -
D E N C E O F T H E V A L U E O F DR. 
S T E E L E ' S H O M E B E C A U S E U N I T Y 
OF O W N E R S H I P I S NOT AN IN-
V A R I A B L E R E Q U I R E M E N T TO 
S E V E R A N C E D A M A G E S . 
Appellants unequivocally maintain that "severance 
damages are not allowed to land which has a different 
owner than that of the tract from which property was 
condemned." Appellants cite the case of Jonas v. State,, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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iv \\ is. 2d 638, 121 . \ . \v . -u W J , vo A X . i t . 2d 880 
(1963), as the leading case on severance damages. I t 
is also cited because "the facK in that ease are similar 
to those in the Steele Ranch case.1' 
Neither assertion •, • »• _ n. *••:/*,* rase JS 
actually ch<-d in tlx A ! K ^notation as supporting 
the vi^w /;//// //////// f// ownership m it! not always exist. 
See \K> .! ; / ' \M Annotation: Kmment Domain-Sever-
ance Damages, p. 894. The instant ease is easily distin-
guishable from Jonas because the ranch IN leased back 
from the corporation <Ti* o:* while in the Jonas case 
there existed no lease. T'•»• Supreme Coiirt of Wisconsin 
said in Jonas tha t : 
We might well agree thai an <^ s ner of (Hit-
parcel (not taken) who has nsed il. and h.i 
the right under lease or other contract to con-
tinue to use it, as a unit with the parcel taken 
would be entitled to severance damage and the 
condemnor would be compelled to pay such 
damage in addition to the value of the parcel 
taken, considered seperately. 
Recovery of severance damages in this case, however, 
was cited - n the ground of insufficiency of evidence to 
show that the owner of the remaining land had any lease 
: i ither contractual right to UM> the condemned land. 
The court in Kessler v. State, 251 JNI.Y.S.2d 487, 
(1964), said that in "unique circumstances such as those 
were one individm; m.*n well have actual ownership 
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over several parcels, it would be unrealistic to treat the 
parcels as seperately owned." 
M.T.M. Realty Corp. v. State, 261 N.Y.S.2d 815 
(1965), involved two family corporations in which the 
original corporation was incorporated to acquire real 
estate for residential development and the other one was 
set up as a subsidiary to undertake subdivision and de-
velopment of properties. The court said: 
While it has been held that the mere con-
veyance of property by an individual to mem-
bers of his immediate family does not ipso 
facto constitute unity of ownership sufficient 
to sustain an award of severance damages, 
Kessler v. State of New York, 21 A.D.2d 568, 
251 N.Y.S.2d 487, the Court is satisfied that 
the corporate entities at bar were truly inte-
grated not only by reason of family ownership 
but by reason of unity of business purpose and 
actual practice so as to sustain the Court's 
determination to treat the parcels conveyed by 
the parent to its wholly owned subsidiary as 
an integrated unit. 
The court in Red Apple Rest, Inc. v. State, 260 
N.Y.S.2d 206, (1965), considered a claim for appropri-
ation for highway purposes of contigious parcels of land 
on both sides of a highway owned by husband and wife 
and by a corporation which was in turn controlled by 
the husband. The court said: 
I t is our opinion that this court must, 
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under the Guptill and Kessler cases, Untk at 
the realistic ownership and control >f the eon-
tigious parcels. If we find 'actual ownership,5 
we must consider contigious parcels as a single 
tract, 
111 Barnes v. North Cat oLuta Stau i i tulr^ ,ir .• 
AVI \ i\ 378, 109 S.E.2d 219, the court held: 
There is no single rule or principle estab-
lished for determining the unity of lands for 
the purpose of awarding damages or offsetting 
benefits in eminent domain cases. The factors 
most generally emphasized are unity of owner-
ship, physical unity and unity of use . . . The 
parcels claimed as a single tract must he owned 
by the same party or parties. It is not a pre-
requisite for unity of ownership that a party 
have the same quality of interest or estate in 
all parts of the t r a c t . . . . However, there must 
be a substantial unity of ownership, (emphasis 
added) 
In Stockton v. Ellingwood. *.)«> I al App. 708, 275 
P.228 (1929), the court found a unity of ownership 
between the part taken and the remaining part of a 
large parcel of land which was in fact owned by a part-
nership, although the legal title to some tracts of such 
land appeared in the name of one partner and other 
tracts stood in the name of the other partner. The < ouri 
pointed out that the lands were used a>s one pared by 
the partners. The court said: 
.. . . . in view of eqi lit) it is immaterial in 
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whose name the legal title to the property 
stands, whether in the name of one partner or 
the names of all. 
To allow severance damages where a portion of a 
parcel of land claimed as a single unit is taken by con-
demnation, unity of ownership between the part taken 
and the remaining part need not always exist. Condem-
nation of two parts of land which have been used to-
gether for a common purpose may be allowed where 
the owner of one part has a certain right or interest, 
although short of ownership, on the other part. See 
State ex rel. La Prade v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 429, 114 
P.2d 891, (1941); East Av. Municipal Utility Dist. v. 
Kieffer, 99 Cal. App. 249, 279 P . 178 (1829); Jonas v. 
State, 19 Wis.2d 638, 121 N.W.2d 235, (1963); State 
ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 
574, 468 P.2d 306, (1970); State ex rel State Highway 
Comm. v. Gray, 81 N.M. 399, 467 P.2d 725 (1970). 
Respondents submit that it is not a fixed rule that 
their must invariably exist a unity of ownership between 
the part taken and the remaining part; that the sub-
stantial reality of common use should and has prevailed 
over any technical legal nicities; and that many courts 
have so recognized such substantial realities. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E S T E E L E R A N C H I N C L U D E D 
DR. S T E E L E ' S H O M E . B O T H H O M E 
A N D R A N C H W E R E O P E R A T E D TO-
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G E T H E R A S A N I N T E G R A T E D E N -
T I T Y . 
Respondents argue that the in icontro verted testi-
mony of Dr . Steele was that the ranch and the home 
were operated as a single unit. Dr . Steele testified that 
his home was "my ranch headquarters. IV 90) H e 
testified thai ihev \u-n- operated together a^ an inte-
grated unit. (Tr. '.W • The doctor often >at on the patio 
of the home checking on the cattle and purebreds. * Tr 
120) H e kept the ranch records at his home (Tr '?-• 
The ranch and home were one integrated unit ami 
were operated as such. This conclusion finds unrefuted 
support in the record. 
Appellants brief on page 7 alleges the ranch opera-
tion is not dependent upon the doctors home, 
The day to day operation of the rao.-li 
is conducted by the foreman who lives in uie 
'ranch house' at the end of the county road east 
of the freeway. IV I J l * 
Wha t appellant's l»n<-I neglects to note are the questions 
on the same page winch indicate the ranch is managed 
from the home. Page 121 of the record reads as follows 
Q ( )h, excuse me, And lli.il rmcm.-m work* 
on the ranch? 
i^ AJUI he performs ;..* • .\ , . ?M r-s 
tiuiis of the ranch ? 
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A Yes. I oversee and tell him in general what 
I want. 
Q. And he does it and reports back to you? 
XJL» X C/&9 • • • • 
The actual quotation in its entirety completely rebuts 
appellants quotation. 
Appellants in their brief on page 7 make the further 
statements that: 
While the home is near the subject tract 
the ranch operation is not dependent upon the 
location of a doctor's home. 
Their brief on page 8 also asserts: 
John Steele could live in any nearby city 
without affecting the value or the operation of 
the ranch, (emphasis added) 
The above statements are totally unsupported by any 
evidence or testimony. 
Appellants brief states that none of the out build-
ings or corrals "which may be associated with the opera-
tion of the ranch are located on the one acre." This in-
fers that the presence of such buildings is indispensible 
to managing the ranch from the home. Respondents ask 
only if it is a necessity to have the corrals on this one 
acre in order to make the home an integral part of the 
operation of the ranch. Obviously the answer is no. 
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1 uruieniiori . these buildings arc nil adajaeent , . \\u 
ranch house and ihc evidence slum1- HUE! the mic aen 
separated tW ihc house ha- hv-i uf i s dimensions along 
\}u rocky wall south and west ol' the house. The acre divi-
u n i'ro
 :s Hie other "yard" property is clearly a conven-
ience description and is otherwise impractical. The ranch 
buildings are only accessible from the public road 
through the same gate that serves the house and the yard 
for the side buildings. This was clearly demonstrated by 
the aerial photographs. l\ is .tnd *\ • • = 11*1 be impossible to 
separate the lit>use iiseil" i'rom Hie ranch side buildings 
because of their close intimate relationship. 
The principle of law is stated at 2? Am Jar. la at 
139 that *.vHh respect to agricultural and rural lands. 
, if the whole area is used er ior a 
farm, ranch or other appropriate puipose, it is 
to be considered one property. Moreover the 
fact that different portions of a farm, ranch, 
or other rural holdings were acquired from 
different persons, or are otherwise held under 
different titles will not prevent its being treated 
as an entirety in the assessment of damages for 
a taking of a part , if the whole area is held and 
operated as a single property, (emphasis 
added ) 
Respondent submit that the mutual interest and 
advantage for Dr . Steele would clearly have demanded 
had he decided to sell, that both tracts be treated as a 
unit for purposes of evaluation by and sale to a willing 
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buyer. The Steele ranch and home were inseparable, 
integrated and were in fact operated as a single property. 
The record amply supports such a conclusion. 
P O I N T V 
T H E J U R Y I M P A R T I A L L Y R E N -
D E R E D A V E R D I C T T H A T S H O U L D 
B E S U S T A I N E D . 
The appellant urge in Point I I of their brief quot-
ing 47 Am.Jur.2d Sec. 321, that the trend of authority 
is to exclude from the juries "all persons who by reason 
of their business or social relations past or present, with 
either of the parties, could be suspected of possible bias." 
This distorts the quotation in its entirety because of 
the necessary qualification which immediately follows, 
Nevertheless, a person may have affiliations 
and friendships, or prejudices and habits of 
thought, which might lead him to look more 
favorably or less favorably for one party or 
the other, upon a case of a particular class or 
upon a case brought by a particular person or 
member of a particular class or persons than 
would the average juror, which are not suf-
ficiently pronounced to disqualify him for jury 
service, (emphasis added) 
The relative nature of bias was noted in 47 Am.Jur. 2d 
at 846, which stated: 
However, it has been said that to a greater 
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or lesser iwU-iiL i»ui> aiiii prejudice form a 
trait common in all men, and, to fall within the 
purview of jury disqualification, certain de-
grees thereof must exist. 
In Siegfried v. ('//// >l Charlottesville, 206 V*i 
27 1, II 12 S.E.2d .*>.")«;. (1965), the court said in a con-
demnation award that: 
There is im h.\<-d standard to serve as a 
test in all cases as to what constitutes 'bias or 
misconduct of or affecting the commissioners 
or jurors as will warrant setting aside the 
award.' Each case must be decided upon its 
own particular facts and circumstances. Tem-
ple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 336 8 S.E.2d 262; 
'29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain :u i n 1344. 
The real question is whether the requisite degree 
of bias, assuming it to exist in this case, was sufficient 
to disqualify the jurors who were Dr. Steele's patients. 
The record was absolutely devoid of any evidence to in-
dicate bias by these patients of Dr. Steele's. The only 
possible evidence of bias is that which may be inferred 
from the professional relationship per se of doctor-
patient. 
This precise question was considered in McCollum 
> Si ah <f Florida, 74 So.2d 74, (1954), a criminal case, 
which was appealed for a refusal to discharge for cause 
a venireman who had sustained a physician-patient re-
rationship with the decedent over a course of years. The 
court held that a professional relationship with the in-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
jured party in a criminal prosecution does not ipso facto 
disqualify a person to serve as a juror. 
In Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 
(1945), the court said that the existence of a debtor-
creditor relationship between a party and a juror does 
not ipso facto disqualify the juror where a statute merely 
provides that a challenge for cause may be taken on that 
ground. The debtor-creditor relationship that appellant 
are concerned about on p. 9 of their brief was a $5.00 
bill owing by Mr. Jones to Dr. Steele. (Tr. 9) Hardly 
consequential. Furthermore, no challenge for cause was 
made by appellant of this juror for that reason. 
Respondent argues that when the qualifications of 
a juror are attacked for bias that the trial courts decision 
is subject to revision only when it has abused the wide 
discretion which it is granted. The reason is that the 
trial court has a better opportunity by seeing the juror 
and noting his manner and demeanor while under exami-
nation. The proof of juror bias must be clear and palp-
able. There is nothing whatsoever in the record in the 
instant case to indicate bias other than an inference from 
the doctor-patient relationship and this relationship is 
ipso facto not sufficient to disqualify a juror for bias. 
P O I N T VI 
A D M I S S I O N O F T H E O R I G I N A L A P -
P R A I S A L E V I D E N C E W A S N O T 
E R R O R B E C A U S E SUCH E V I D E N C E 
W A S A D M I T T E D TO T E S T T H E 
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C R E D I B I L I T Y n * i i ~ STATE 'S 
E X P E R T W I T N E S S . 
Evidence of tin original appraisal valuation was 
admitted af t u The state furnished an original ap-
praisal estimate » hidi differed from the testimony later 
given hv \hr same state's expert. This original appraisal 
evidence was, therefore, received by the court as im-
peachment evidence testing the credibility of the state's 
expert, Mr. Smith. The defendant submits that contrary 
to the state's assertion of error in admitting such evi-
dence. ii dearly was not err*>r 1iccausethe credibility of a 
witness is always subject to impeachment, A eorreei 
perspecthr of the impact of such evidence is essential 
in a land condemnation case. Nichols on Eminent Do-
main at £ I H. I i :* ; slates: 
Moreover, the modern tendency to restrict 
the setting aside of verdicts for errors which 
do not cause substantial injustice is especially 
noticeable in land damage cases. Such cases 
usually involve a protracted and expensive 
trial, and, as a rule, are determined by the con-
sideration of a mass of separate items of evi-
dence. The admission or exclusion of one bit of 
testimony of questionable materiality is not 
likely to be of vital importance ,, , 
CONCLUSION 
f j l e verdict was amply supported by competent 
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testimony. Applying the legal criteria governing Com-
mon-law actions the verdict is reasonable. 
Technical unity of ownership is not always neces-
sary in order to establish severance damages. Numerous 
courts have so recognized and there exists no single 
criteria on unity of ownership for purposes of determin-
ing damages in eminent domain cases. The home of Dr. 
Steele and his ranch were inseperable and operated to-
gether as one. Dr. Steele's uncontroverted testimony 
so established their integrated nature. 
A relationship of doctor-patient is ipso facto in-
sufficient to disqualify a juror for alleged bias. The 
admission of the original appraisal evidence was not 
error because the credibility of a witness is always sub-
ject to impeachment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON H O W A R D 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
E K S A Y N A N D E R S O N 
345 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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